Double Attack

How a Coordinated Network Promotes Aleksandar Vučić and Undermines Independent Media in Serbia’s 2026 Election Campaign

Serbia Election Monitoring Report - October 2026

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Ahead of Serbia’s parliamentary elections on 25 October 2026, the Balkan Free Media Initiative (BFMI), in collaboration with Clemson University’s Media Forensics Hub, investigated how coordinated inauthentic behaviour (CIB) is being used to manipulate political discourse, amplify support for Aleksandar Vučić, and undermine independent journalism. The report, “Double Attack: How a Coordinated Network Promotes Aleksandar Vučić and Undermines Independent Media,” exposes the scale, tactics, and objectives of an organised digital influence operation targeting Serbia’s information environment during a critical electoral period.

Through extensive social media monitoring, network analysis, and examination of political and media narratives, the investigation identified 332 coordinated inauthentic accounts responsible for more than 39,000 messages over just 12 days. Operating primarily on X, with a smaller presence on Facebook, the network artificially amplifies pro-government messaging while systematically attacking independent news outlets, particularly N1 and Nova.rs. These digital campaigns coincide with mounting political, regulatory, and ownership pressures on independent media, creating a dual threat to journalistic independence and informed public debate.

Beyond Serbia, the report highlights broader vulnerabilities in Europe's democratic information landscape, particularly in EU candidate countries where regulatory oversight of online political manipulation remains limited. By exposing weaknesses in platform enforcement, electoral oversight, and protections for independent media, the investigation provides evidence-based recommendations for technology companies, European institutions, and Serbian authorities to strengthen accountability, safeguard media freedom, and protect the integrity of democratic processes.

Findings

  • A Coordinated Network Manipulates Serbia’s Online Political Debate. The investigation identified 332 inauthentic accounts organised into 97 coordinated clusters, generating 39,313 messages in just 12 days to influence political narratives ahead of Serbia’s October 2026 election.

  • Manufactured Support Amplifies Aleksandar Vučić’s Political Influence. More than one-third of the network’s activity focused on promoting Vučić, artificially boosting his visibility and creating the appearance of widespread public support through coordinated reposts and engagement.

  • Independent Media Face Sustained and Targeted Attacks. The network systematically targeted N1 and Nova.rs, two of Serbia’s most trusted independent news outlets, flooding their posts with hostile replies designed to undermine their credibility and weaken public trust.

  • Online Manipulation Reinforces Offline Pressure on Media Freedom. Coordinated digital attacks coincide with political pressure, ownership changes, and threats to editorial independence, exposing independent journalists to a dual campaign of intimidation and discrediting.

  • Weak Platform Enforcement and Regulatory Gaps Leave Elections Vulnerable. Despite X suspending approximately 20% of the identified accounts, the network’s core remained largely intact. Serbia’s limited oversight of online campaigning and its exclusion from EU Digital Services Act protections leave significant vulnerabilities to electoral manipulation.

Recommendations

  • Strengthen Platform Accountability and Enforcement. X and Facebook must take decisive action against coordinated inauthentic behaviour, targeting entire networks rather than isolated accounts. Platforms should publicly disclose enforcement actions and strengthen cross-platform cooperation.

  • Make Media Freedom a Priority in Serbia’s EU Accession Process. The European Commission should assess threats to independent journalism and use its enlargement and funding mechanisms to hold Serbia accountable for protecting media freedom and democratic standards.

  • Safeguard the Editorial Independence of N1 and Nova S. Luxembourg’s authorities should ensure that changes in ownership and management do not compromise editorial independence, while preventing regulatory arrangements that could weaken existing protections.

  • Ensure Fair and Transparent Election Oversight. Serbian institutions must apply media regulations consistently across all broadcasters, including pro-government outlets, and require political parties to disclose spending on online campaigning.

  • Extend Election Monitoring Beyond Polling Day. Domestic and international observers should continue tracking coordinated online manipulation after the election, particularly attempts to influence perceptions of the results, discredit independent media, or undermine election observers.