Tackling “TikTokcracy” in the Balkans:

A blueprint for fighting algorithmic manipulation in Europe

About


Download Here

BFMI’s forthcoming report, Tackling TikTokracy: A blueprint for fighting algorithmic manipulation in Europe, reveals how algorithmic influence operations intersect with fragile media ecosystems to shape democratic outcomes.

Drawing on the 2024 Romanian presidential elections and looking ahead to upcoming contests across the Balkans, the report shows how both online platforms and traditional media amplified manipulative narratives, often without adequate scrutiny.

By mapping recurring tactics of algorithmic manipulation and exposing the role of captured or polarized media outlets in accelerating their spread, the study highlights the urgent need for European institutions, national authorities, and platforms to adopt stronger safeguards. Its policy recommendations are designed to be applicable in both EU and non-EU contexts.

Findings


  • Romania’s 2024–25 elections were distorted by a coordinated TikTok operation using over 25,000 fake accounts, exposing major gaps in platform oversight and national preparedness.

  • Bulgaria faces a constant, economically embedded manipulation environment driven by “mushroom websites” and cross-platform amplification tied to entrenched political–media networks.

  • TikTok was the most heavily exploited platform, with tactics like Fire Hose posting, hashtag hijacking and blended influencer–bot networks enabling fringe parties to reach young voters at scale.

  • Kosovo’s 2025 elections saw coordinated activity and cross-border disinformation targeting institutions, fuelling ethnic tensions and heightening security risks.

  • Across all three cases, shared weaknesses—underregulated platforms, weak transparency, fragile media and limited cross-border coordination—enable digital manipulation to spread quickly.

Recommendations


Require platforms to proactively mitigate systemic risks, ensure political ad transparency and apply rapid election-period moderation. Enforcement must be consistent across member states to close existing loopholes.

Strengthen DSA Enforcement

Position the EUDS as Europe’s real-time early-warning and rapid-response system. It should connect regulators, platforms, civil society, and media into a coordinated cross-border defence network.

Operationalise the European Democracy Shield (EUDS)

Enforce EMFA and TTPA to expose covert funding streams and undisclosed political content. This includes dismantling disinformation revenue networks and improving the traceability of campaign spending.

Enhance Transparency in Political Financing & Media Ownership

Provide targeted funding, training and digital forensics tools to strengthen credible media. A more resilient media sector improves monitoring capabilities and public trust.

Expand Support for Independent Media

Scale digital literacy and early-disinformation awareness programmes for youth and first-time voters. Extend these initiatives to candidate countries with vulnerable information ecosystems.

Invest in Digital Literacy & Pre-bunking