BFMI and Sensika’s TikTokcracy Tracker
Live monitoring of algorithmic manipulation in Southeastern Europe:
2026 Bulgarian elections
About
Digital manipulation is no longer an exceptional event in European elections. It is a recurring feature with documented precedents in Romania, Moldova, and beyond. What varies is the speed and coherence of the institutional response. With Hungary, Slovenia, and Bulgaria all voting within weeks of one another, Europe’s spring electoral calendar presents both an opportunity for coordinated institutional vigilance and a risk that attention and resources will be stretched too thin to be effective.
This tracker is part of BFMI’s & Sensika's ongoing effort to close the gap between the identification of manipulation and the institutional response to it. It builds directly on Tackling TikTokcracy in the Balkans: A Blueprint for Fighting Algorithmic Manipulation in Europe, produced in partnership with Sensika and presented at the European Parliament in late autumn last year. The report mapped the tactics and infrastructure of algorithmic manipulation across the region, identified Bulgaria as a persistently high-risk environment, and flagged specific dormant networks that had not yet been activated.
The first edition of the current tracker covers the period up to 17 March 2026, with the Bulgarian parliamentary elections scheduled for 19 April. Its central finding is that Bulgaria's information environment is already being manipulated at scale, that the manipulation is sophisticated enough to be difficult to distinguish from genuine public sentiment, and that neither the platforms carrying it nor the authorities responsible for regulating it have yet responded in any meaningful way. That combination of active interference, legal obligations unmet, and institutions yet to act is what this tracker exists to document and to challenge.
Findings
Pro-Radev content is dominating Facebook and TikTok, significantly outperforming all other political actors, with GERB trailing far behind.
The key unresolved issue is whether this online momentum reflects real public support or is being artificially amplified through manipulation.
Monitoring data points to three active tactics: boosting content through purchased pages, coordinated inauthentic cross-platform activity, and hijacking opponents’ hashtags.
Disinformation from clickbait websites is spreading through the same networks, creating risks not only for the election but for Bulgaria’s wider information security.
The report argues that current European safeguards are too weak, and that urgent institutional action is needed before 19 April to protect electoral integrity and democratic credibility.
Recommendations
Immediate audits of the accounts, pages, and networks identified in this report are warranted under existing coordinated inauthentic behaviour policies. Pages demonstrably purchased and repurposed for undisclosed political activity meet the threshold for labelling or suspension under current terms of service.
Clusters of profiles administering multiple political pages simultaneously require investigation for automated or coordinated operation. Hashtags subject to systematic flooding or artificial saturation require enhanced monitoring and, where manipulation is confirmed, remedial action.
The network of accounts operating on behalf of DPS — New Beginning merits particular scrutiny given the volume, uniformity, and evident coordination of their output.
Dedicated Bulgarian-language election integrity liaisons and clear public guidance on reporting mechanisms are a minimum standard of electoral preparedness. In the days before 19 April, proactive monitoring of political content in Bulgaria warrants significant intensification. Applying and extending initiatives like Meta’s Community Integrity Team and TikTok’s Global Elections Integrity Hub are warranted.