Trusted Flagger System needs tough safeguards for journalism and freedom of speech. Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour is now the most pressing challenge to electoral integrity for the DSA

The Balkan Free Media Initiative (BFMI) today called on the European Commission to reinforce political independence, free speech, transparency and accountability safeguards in the Digital Service Act’s (DSA’s) Trusted Flagger system, or risk creating tools for governments to silence critical voices.

Reforms must include

Guaranteed political independence.
‘Illegal content’ scope limited to the most serious and legally certain cases.
Strengthened protections for politically contested language.
Trusted Flagger methodologies and rulings opened to public scrutiny.

The current rules enable national authorities to select civil society organisations, funded by government, to rule on illegal content, beyond public scrutiny, which the platforms are commercially driven to remove.

BFMI, with roots in the Balkans, believes that without these reforms, the system is exposed to abuse by would-be autocrats seeking to silence their critics in journalism.

The call was made in BFMI’s submission to the European Commission’s consultation on the draft guidelines on Trusted Flaggers.

Reinforce Political independence

Trusted Flaggers are required to demonstrate their independence from platforms that may be paying for their service, but there is no requirement to demonstrate political independence by those receiving government funds. This is particularly alarming as the European Commission is under pressure to finance Trusted Flaggers following the consultation.

Limit the scope of illegal content and protect politically contested language

Trusted Flaggers were established under the DSA to flag ‘illegal content’ for the platforms to swiftly remove. This is vital work, given the extent of extreme violent and toxic content online.

But ‘illegal content’ reaches far beyond hate speech and incitement to violence, to include harassment, insult, defamation, privacy, intellectual property, and more. The laws on speech, moreover, are designed to be ruled on in a public court, with a right to defence, and a judge to weigh up alleged harm against intent, public interest and right to free expression.

Politically contested language is particularly ill-suited to be ruled on by Trusted Flaggers, especially those representing a community. Political language is sometimes harmful, but determining its legality should only be reserved for a public court.

Trusted Flaggers should limit their rulings to only the most harmful and clear-cut cases of ‘illegal’ content.

Increase transparency and accountability

To build public confidence, Trusted Flaggers must also be required to open their methodologies and rulings to public scrutiny. We demand transparency and accountability of the platforms and we must demand it of institutions set up to rule on the platforms.

Decisions over the limits of freedom of speech must not be taken behind closed doors.

The incentive to delete

Platforms are not required to follow alerts and they can report over-zealous Trusted Flaggers. These are important checks on the system. Nevertheless, the legal and commercial incentives point platforms in one direction; take down the content, update moderation systems and move on.

Flagging content removes the platforms’ ‘safe harbour’ protections exposing them to legal action, investigations and substantial fines. The rational business response is to delete swiftly, without reflection.

The risks of a Trusted Flagger system that functions as intended

The Trusted Flagger system is still in its infancy. It is under-resourced. It is subject to political and legal pressure, and there is no certainty it will succeed.

BFMI’s assessment, however, is based on the scenario where Trusted Flaggers perform as DSA policy makers intended, and they exercise powerful influence over platform moderation systems.

For the Trusted Flagger system to succeed, the necessary safeguards must be built in first.

Coordinated inauthentic behaviour and electoral integrity

The most consequential electoral threats documented in 2024-2026 are not illegal content. They are coordinated inauthentic behaviour (CIB), audience laundering, platform manipulation, hashtag hijacking, and the cross-platform amplification of domestic actors using imported algorithmic techniques.

The digital threats of disinformation and electoral integrity have evolved beyond the reach of the DSA’s tools, and the European Commission should use the EU Democracy Shield to adapt new strategies to counter CIB.

This should include: